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ARTICLES

THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT: CONFLICT AND
RESOLUTION
THOMAS

I.

M.

SUSMAN*

INTRODUCTION

It is not unusual for federal statutes to come into conflict. Occasionally, Congress directs its attention to one subject or another
with little apparent concern for what previous Congresses have said
about the same subject. This is the grist that administrative and
judicial mills sort and separate.
It is unusual, however, for Congress to step in and clearly resolve conflicting laws in a timely and decisive fashion. This article
addresses a troublesome conflict between the Privacy Act and the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") and the congressional initiative in 1984 to resolve that conflict. The conflict sharply divided
agencies and courts, and had only months before been brought to
the doorstep of the United States Supreme Court for resolution.
This article sets the stage for the conflict, describes the storyline of
the dispute, and provides the perspectives of the various players. It
is a story with a happy ending, measured by the purposes and principles of both statutes.
* Partner, Ropes & Gray, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Yale University, 1964; J.D.
University of Texas School of Law, 1967. Mr. Susman was chief counsel to the Senate
Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee during approval of the 1974
Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act and headed an American Bar Association committee that developed recommendations on the subject of this article. The
author acknowledges the assistance of Sloane Levy, George Washington School of
Law, in the revision and polishing of manuscript for publication.
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STATUTES IN CONFLICT

The Freedom of Information Act

The FOIA,1 enacted in 1966, established a statutory basis for
public access to government information." The senate sponsor of the
law stated the principal motivation behind the FOIA: "A government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks to
serve; it damages its own integrity and operation. It breeds distrust,
dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty."' Thus,
the basic purpose of the FOIA is "to protect people's right to obtain
information about their government, to know what their government
is doing, and to obtain information about government activities and
policies .. .
To facilitate this purpose, the FOIA establishes a presumption
that all records of governmental agencies must be accessible to the
public,5 unless they are specifically exempt from disclosure by the
FOIA or another statute. The Act imposes a tripartite scheme of
disclosure. First, each federal agency is required to publish descriptions in the Federal Register of the agency's organization, procedures for the public to obtain information, statements of the
agency's function, the rules of procedure, a description of the
agency's forms, substantive rules of general applicability, and statements of general policy.' Second, each agency must make available
for public inspection, or copying, final opinions in agency adjudications, statements of policy and interpretations not published in the
Federal Register, administrative and staff manuals that affect the7
public, and current indices of this publicly available material.
Third, all other agency records must be made public upon request,,
pursuant to the published rules of the agency, unless they fall into
one of the enumerated exemptions of the Act.' An agency, therefore,
may not withhold information properly requested unless the record
is covered by one of the exemptions. The structure of the statute
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2418.

3. 110 CONG. REc. 17,087 (July 28, 1964) (statement of Sen. E. Long).
4.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210 (4th Cir. 1976)

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
5. H.R. REP. No. 199, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, Citizen's Guide on Using the
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy .Act of 1974 to Request Government
Records [hereinafter Citizens Guide], reprinted in 831 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 1
(Oct. 19, 1987).

6.
7.
8.
9.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1982).
Id. § 552(a)(2).
Id. § 552(a)(3).
Id. § 552(b).
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requires the fullest possible disclosure of information to the public. 10
B.

The Privacy Act

The Privacy Act of 1974" was designed to protect the privacy of
individuals by providing them with more control over the gathering,
dissemination, and accuracy of information about themselves contained in government files."2 The legislation was a response to the
"illegal, unwise, [and] overbroad, investigation[s] . . . of law-abiding
citizens . . . [by] overzealous investigators, and the . . . wrongful
disclosure and use . . . of personal files held by Federal agencies." 3
Congress feared that widespread suspect information that government agencies gathered, coupled with new computer technology,
greatly infringed on the privacy rights of individuals."
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Privacy Act of
1974. The Act creates a number of safeguards against infringements
of an individual's right to privacy.'5 First, the Act sets informationgathering standards for all agencies and limits their authority to collect information about individuals. 6 In addition, the Act restricts
the disclosure of agency records containing personal information to
a third party without the consent of the individual to whom the record pertains. 7 This restriction is subject, however, to twelve exceptions.'" The Act also provides that an agency must grant to an individual an opportunity to see and copy records concerning himself;'
upon discovering information that is inaccurate or incomplete, the
individual is accorded the right to ask the agency to amend these
errors.2 0 This provision is also subject to exceptions.2 '
10.
11.
12.
13.

Citizens Guide, supra note 5, at 2.
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
The Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 6916.
14. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 6919.
This fear is best represented in Senator Ervin's statement on June 11, 1974:
[Diespite our reverence for the constitutional principles of limited Government
and freedom of the individual, Government is in danger of tilting the scales
against those concepts by means of its information-gathering tactics and its
technical capacity to store and distribute information. When this quite natural
tendency of Government to acquire and keep.., information about citizens is
enhanced by computer technology.., the resulting threat to individual privacy
makers] it necessary for Congress to reaffirm the principle of limited, responsive Government on behalf of freedom.

Id.
15.
16.
17.
outside
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 6917.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1982).
Id. § 552a(b). This restriction applies to third parties both within and
the government. Id.
Id. §§ 552a(b)(1)-(12).
Id. § 552a(d)(1).
Id. § 552a(d)(2).
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C. Relationship Between the Two Laws
The FOIA, when enacted, was intended by Congress to provide
a mechanism for access to government records by the press, scholars, businesses, and others interested in the workings of government.
To the extent that an individual wanted to find out what information government agencies maintained about himself, the FOIA also
provided a means of access because it made no distinction regarding
the relationship between the person requesting the information and
the information requested.2 One of the earliest cases filed pursuant
to the FOIA, and reported in a congressional subcommittee's review
of the Act,23 involved a lawsuit by a prisoner seeking his pre-sentence report.'
Since the FOIA became effective, tens of thousands of individuals have used the law as a basis to request their files from agencies
of the federal government. Litigation has ensued in many instances,
and the question has uniformly been-before agencies at the administrative level, and before courts on review - whether one of the
FOIA's nine exemptions allowed the agency to withhold the requested record. After 1975, however, the FOIA was not the sole
means of access a subject 25 had to government files pertaining to
himself. In that year the Privacy Act became effective, providing
new and independent rights and procedures governing subject access
to covered systems of records.2 "
From the Privacy Act's inception, the relationship between that
Act and the FOIA was ambiguous. Because both acts applied to subject access of records, a tension inevitably evolved. The potential for
conflict was magnified due to a lack of explicit statutory language
pertaining to the relationship between the Acts. Ultimately, Con21. Id. §§ 552a(j)-(k).
22. A FOIA request may be made by "any person." Id. § 552(a)(3). The requester need not meet any status requirements or demonstrate any interest in or
need for the information sought. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Foreigners, corporations
and prisoners all have equal rights of access along with United States citizens and the
media, for example. See generally Doherty v. United States Dept. of Justice, 596 F.
Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985).
23. The Freedom of Information Act (Ten Months Review):
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedureof the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
24. Cook v. Willingham, Civ. No. L-235 (D. Kansas 1968). Order dismissing action reprinted in The Freedom of Information Act (Ten Months Review): Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure at the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at 15-16 (1968).
25. A "subject," for purposes of this article, refers to an individual who requests
information concerning himself.
26. 5 U.S.C. §552a (1982). Unlike the FOIA, the Privacy Act confines the use of
its access provisions to citizens and "aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Id. § 552(a)(2).
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gress had to enact legislation to resolve the conflicts between the
Privacy Act and the FOIA.
1. FOIA - Privacy Act Conflict

The Privacy Act had one immediate and indisputable effect on
the disclosure of information under the FOIA: it removed agency
discretion to disclose information that might have been withheld
under the sixth exemption. Exemption six of the FOIA protects
from mandatory disclosure information which would constitute a

"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ' ' 27 Since the

FOIA's exemptions operate only on a permissive basis,u prior to the
enactment of the Privacy Act an agency could exercise its discretion
to determine that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted
privacy invasion but nonetheless-because of other governmental or
private interests in disclosure-decide to release the data anyway.
The Privacy Act, however, instituted a general prohibition against
public disclosure, without the written consent of the subject, of personal information from those systems of records covered by that Act
unless disclosure was required by the FOIA." Since the disclosure of
privacy-invading material was not required by the FOIA, it became
prohibited by the Privacy Act.80 In essence, the discretion of agencies to release information under the FOIA's exemption six was
eliminated after enactment of the Privacy Act.
The Privacy Act had another impact on disclosure of records
that the FOIA previously governed: it expanded the information
available to an individual requesting records about himself. For example, under the Privacy Act there is no exemption comparable to
the FOIA's exemption five. Therefore, internal agency memoranda
27. Id. § 552(b)(6). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase to mean
that the exemption requires a balancing of the individual's right to privacy against
preservation of the purpose of the FOIA-the public's right to government information. "The device adopted to achieve that balance was the limited exemption, where
privacy was threatened, for 'clearly unwarranted' invasions of personal privacy." Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
28. According to the Supreme Court, the exemptions set forth in "subsection
(b) demarcates the agency's obligation to disclose" but "does not foreclose disclosure." Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979). The Chrysler Court held that
FOIA exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure but only permissive. Id. at
293. Thus, the information falling within the Act's nine exemptions may nonetheless
be disclosed if the agency chooses to disclose it (unless some other statute or regulatory prohibition is applicable).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982).
30. Sullivan v. Veterans Admin., 617 F. Supp. 258, 259 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding
the effect of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982) "is to permit an agency to disclose records
where the FOIA requires it, but to prohibit such disclosure where a specific FOIA
exemption allows the agency to withhold the information"); see also Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 471 F. Supp. 1023, 1031 (D.D.C.
1979).
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subject to the deliberative privilege would be exempt under the
FOIA but may not be withheld from a Privacy Act requester."1
The relationship between the Privacy Act and the FOIA, however, soon proved to be troublesome with regard to subject requesters. Neither the Privacy Act nor its legislative history clearly states
whether that law is the exclusive means of access an individual has
to obtain his own' record in systems of individually identifiable
records. Nor does the statute precisely state how it is to relate access
requests made pursuant to the FOIA. In fact, a certain superficial
circularity appears on the face of the FOIA and Privacy Acts. The
third exemption of the FOIA states that matters are exempt from
mandatory disclosure if they are specifically exempt from disclosure
by some other statute.2 At the same time, the Privacy Act states
that no covered record should be disclosed, except with the consent
of the subject of the record, unless the FOIA requires disclosure."
With the passage of the Privacy Act, both agencies and courts struggled with this apparent conundrum. Some courts and agencies asserted that the Privacy Act was an exemption three statute under
the FOIA, thereby making the Privacy Act the exclusive mechanism
for subject requesters to gain access to records pertaining to them.
Others treated the FOIA and Privacy Act as independent and separate statutes. 4
Congress finally stepped in and resolved this conflict in 1984
when it enacted the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act. 5
Section 2(c) of that law inserted a new provision into the Privacy
Act stating: "No agency shall rely on any exemption in this section
to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions of section 552 of this
title [FOIA]." s Congress resolved the conflict by explicitly stating
that neither the Privacy Act nor FOIA were to be the exclusive
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1982) (providing that no agency shall rely on a FOIA
exemption to withhold information accessible to an individual under the Privacy
Act); see, e.g., May v. Department of Air Force, 777 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g
denied, 800 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1986) (military promotion recommendations properly
withheld under the FOIA's exemption five were held possibly subject to disclosure
under the Privacy Act).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (1982). The text of section 552(b)(3) (as amended in
1976) provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are- . . .
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
33. Id. § 552a(b)(2).
34. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
35. Pub. L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1982).
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means of disclosure with regard to subject requesters. Congress enacted this provision while the issue it addressed was squarely before
the Supreme Court for resolution in two consolidated cases."' The
relationship between the Privacy Act and the FOIA became subject
of both Supreme Court and congressional attention and emphasized
its importance to both agencies and the public.
2. Implications of the Conflict
The significance of the relationship between the' Privacy Act
and the FOIA can best be demonstrated by examining what the consequences would have been had Congress acted differently on this
issue (or not acted) and had the Supreme Court upheld the position
that the Privacy Act was an exemption three statute. There would
have been both procedural and substantive implications had the
Privacy Act been held ultimately to provide the exclusive vehicle for
access by the subject to individually identifiable records.3 8
The first implications are procedural and concern the processing
of individual requests for information. Had the Privacy Act been
held to be the exclusive means by which a subject of a record could
obtain information about himself, the Privacy Act procedures would
have controlled the request. As the following examples demonstrate,
this would have imposed a more restrictive procedural mechanism
on subject requesters as compared to the FOIA: •
(1) The FOIA requires a response to any request for information
within 10 days.39 The Privacy Act does not require a response.
(2) The FOIA provides for an administrative appeal of a denial of
access. 10 The Privacy Act does not provide for an appeal.
(3) A two-year statute of limitations is applicable to civil actions
under 42the Privacy Act;" there is a six-year limitation under the
FOIA.

(4)Agencies may impose identity-verification requirements on individuals seeking access under the Privacy Act,4 but there is no similar requirement under the FOIA.
37. United States Dep't of Justice v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14 (1984); Shapiro v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 469 U.S. 14 (1984).
38. This type of access is sometimes referred to, in Privacy Act parlance, as
"subject access."
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1982).
40. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii).
41. Id. § 552a(g)(5).

42. There was thought to be no statute of limitations in FOIA cases until 1987,
when the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the general federal
limitations statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1982), applies to FOIA cases, imposing a six
year limitation. Spannaus v. United States Dep't of Justice, 824 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 522a(f)(1) (1982).
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(5) The Privacy Act permits an agency to restrict disclosure of
certain medical records to the requester's physician rather than to the
requester himself;" the FOIA contains no comparable authorization.

(6)The FOIA exemptions are to be applied on a line-by-line and
page-by-page basis, with disclosure required for reasonably segregable
information; Privacy Act exemptions ordinarily apply to entire agen-

cies and to complete systems of records."8

Because of these procedural differences between the Privacy Act
and the FOIA, a congressional or Supreme Court conclusion that the
Privacy Act was the exclusive mechanism for subject requesters
would have clearly restricted and confined the process for the
requester.
More importantly, however, would have been the substantive
implication of treating the Privacy Act as the exclusive method of
subject access to records. Under a preclusive Privacy Act, if the requested records were part of a Privacy Act system of records, and
that system had been declared specifically exempt from the access
requirements of the Privacy Act under subsection (j) or the records
had been excepted from access under the more specific exemptions
in subsection (k), then the subject of the records could not obtain
access to them, even if no FOIA exemption applied.
This severe limitation on access by the subject of a record
would not have applied, however, to third-party requesters. The exemptions from requiring a subject access to his records in subsections (i) and (k) of the Privacy Act' 6 do not apply to subsection
(b)(2) of that Act, which prohibits disclosure to a third party without consent of the subject unless disclosure is required under the
FOIA.17 The subject of a CIA or FBI file could thus be precluded
from obtaining that record because the Privacy Act has authorized
those agencies to exempt their records from access under subsections (j) and (k) of that Act. But, assuming no applicable FOIA exemption (and even exemption six might be circumvented if the subject gave his consent), a third party could obtain those same records
under the FOIA while a subject requester could not if the Privacy
Act was his exclusive means of access. This would have resulted in a
third-party anomaly. This anomaly would have provided third-party
requesters greater access under the FOIA to a record about an individual than that individual would have on his own.
44. Id. § 552a(f)(2).
45. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k). Note that some courts
have held that a segregability requirement is to be applied to information withheld
under the Privacy Act's exemption (k)(5). See May v. Department of Air Force, 777
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 800 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1986); Nemetz v.
Department of Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(j)-(k) (1982).
47. Id. § 552(b)(2).
0
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Additionally, if the FOIA access were foreclosed from first-party
requesters, the use of straw-men third-party requesters could have
been expected to multiply and, because of the FOIA's "any person"
standard," could not easily be inhibited.
Had Congress declared the Privacy Act to be the exclusive
means of access for subject requesters, subject access could have
been severely restricted. The 1984 statutory resolution of the relationship between the two statutes thus affected both the substantive
and procedural rights of the public, as well as the responsibilities of
federal agencies. It is also clear that resolving the conflict between
the two laws by declaring that neither was exclusive was the wisest
course of action by Congress consistent with the spirit and objectives of both the Privacy Act and FOIA.
III.

RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON PRIVACY ACT AND

FOIA

RELATIONSHIP

Congress' decision to declare the FOIA and Privacy Acts as separate and independent sources of access to government records is
supported by the legislative history of the Privacy Act and the 1974
amendments to the FOIA. The House and Senate reports from the
enactment of the Privacy Act and the 1974 FOIA amendments
clearly support the conclusion that Congress in 1984 properly resolved the conflict between the two acts and did so within the spirit
and objectives of the two statutes.
A. Evolution of Statutory Language of the Privacy Act
The legislative history of the Privacy Act is in many ways ambiguous and confusing regarding the relationship between that law
and the FOIA. At the time the Privacy Act was being developed,
this confusion was not predictable because in the House of Representatives the same committee and subcommittee members were
working simultaneously on both the 1974 FOIA amendments and
the Privacy Act.49 Although two different committees handled the
bill in the Senate, both had been involved in joint hearings at the
early stages on both of these subjects. In addition, the staff re48. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Related to the third-party anomaly is the anomaly that might arise when a foreign national or a business enterprise
seeks access to records. Neither is entitled to access under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(a)(2) (1982) (definition of individual), but the Act's exemptions also would not
apply to them. Thus, were the Privacy Act a (b)(3) statute, businesses and foreign
nationals would have greater rights of access than United States citizens.
49. Jurisdiction over both the Privacy Act and the FOIA in the House of Representatives rested in the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual
Rights (presently the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture) of the Committee on Government Operations.
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mained in close communication throughout the process.50 Furthermore, Congress considered both bills during the same time period 5
Nevertheless, the committees apparently did not detect an ambiguity over the relationship between the Privacy Act and the FOIA.
Therefore, it was not explicitly addressed in either statute.
A more careful consideration of the final language of the Privacy Act, through the mechanism of a House-Senate conference,
would no doubt have shed more light on the FOIA-Privacy Act relationship and might potentially have led to a clarification in the legislation itself. As it was, the only reliable legislative history of the
final Privacy Act consists principally of a staff memorandum inserted into the CongressionalRecord on the day the House and Senate52 adopted the final legislative language. That memorandum provides some indication of congressional intent on many important
issues. Among the issues is the relationship between the FOIA and
Privacy Act. Although ambiguous, there is also evidence in the
larger body of legislative history to support both sides on the question. of whether Congress intended the Privacy Act as the exclusive
means of subject access to records.".
1. Senate
When originally introduced by Senator Ervin on May 1, 1974,
the first Senate version of privacy legislation contained no reference
to the FOIA or how the proposed new privacy law would affect access under the FOIA." As reported from the Senate Committee on
Government Operations later that year, however, the bill contained
two references to the FOIA. First, Section 202(c) provided that the
proposed Privacy Act restrictions on disclosure "shall not apply
when disclosure would be required or permitted pursuant to" the
FOIA 55 The Senate Report on S. 3418 describes that the purpose of
50. The 1974 FOIA Amendments were reported from the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary; the Privacy Act was processed through the Committee on Government
Operations.
51. Both the Privacy Act and 1974 FOIA Amendments were considered during
the Ninety-Third Congress and both were subject to final floor consideration in the
fall of 1974.
52. The staff memorandum entitled Analysis of House and Senate Compromise
Amendments to the FederalPrivacy Act was inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
during both House and Senate debates. 120 CONG. REc. 40,405, 40,881 (1974).
53. The legislative history of the Privacy Act has been compiled in a Source
Book on Privacy, COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, AND
COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Cong., 2d Sess.

(SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY COMM.

1976) [hereinafter

94th

PRIVACY SOURCE

BOOK].

54. S. 3418, as introduced, reprintedin PRIVACY

9.
55. Id. at 139.

SOURCE BOOK,

supra note 53, at

The Privacy Act and the FOIA
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section 202(c) was "to meet the objections of press and media representatives that the statutory right of access to public records and
the right of disclosure of government information might be defeated
if such restrictions were placed on the public and press.""0
The second reference to FOIA was in section 205(b), which
stated: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to permit the withholding of any personal information which is otherwise required to
be disclosed by law or any regulation thereunder. '5 7 The report indicates that section 205(b) "[rleflects the Committee's intent that the
Act does not affect existing requirements to disclose, disseminate, or
publish information which an agency is required to collect for the
purpose of making such disclosure.""8
Senator Ervin, who managed the bill on the floor of the Senate,
later proposed a series of perfecting amendments. Included was an
amendment that simply deleted section 202(c).5s The Senate then
went on to approve privacy legislation that continued to contain section 205(b) quoted above. While not saying so directly, it appears
from the language in the Senate report describing the purpose of
these amendments that the Senate Committee intended its proposed privacy legislation to have no affect on individual access
rights already available under FOIA.6" The subsequent approval of
Section 205(b) also supports the finding that Congress did not intend for the Privacy Act to be exclusive to the FOIA with regard to
subject requesters.
2. House of Representatives
In the House, privacy legislation was originally introduced and
later reported from the Committee on Government Operations with
no language permitting public disclosure of personal records. In its
initial report on H.R. 16373, the House Committee stated its belief
that a broad exemption is desirable for CIA and criminal justice
56.

S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Seas., at 71, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
NEWS 6916, 6985.
S. 3418, as reported, reprinted in PRIVACY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 53, at

CONG. & ADMIN.

57.

97.
58. S. REP.No. 1183, at 77.
59. 120 CONG. REC. 36,920 (1974).
60. The Committee somewhat contradictorily also observed that "[i]n particular, it would not be appropriate to allow individuals to see their own intelligence or
investigate files. Therefore, the bill exempts such information from access and challenge requirements.
...
S.REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 23, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6916, 6985. The Committee continued stating that

the provisions relating to law enforcement records were not adequate. It referred to
additional legislation dealing specifically with criminal justice records and indicated
its feeling that "general privacy legislation must assure subjects of law enforcement
files at least these minimal rights until such time as the more comprehensive criminal
justice legislation is passed." Id.
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records because they contain "particularly sensitive information
[and] the most delicate information regarding national security.""1
At the same time, the Committee stressed that it did not intend to
require the CIA and criminal justice agencies to withhold personal
records from the individuals to whom they pertain. In generally
precatory language, the Committee urged "those agencies to keep
open whatever files are presently opened . . . ."' This language,
contained in the Committee's discussion of its proposed exemptions,
was also mirrored in its discussion of the bill's section relating to
conditions of disclosure."
When the House legislation, H.R. 16,373, reached the floor for
debate, a variety of amendments was offered. A few implicated specific areas involving the interrelationship between the pending privacy legislation and the FOIA, but none addressed the more basic
question of which law was to prevail in case of apparent conflict."'
3. Compromise Bill
The final version of the privacy bill, which became the Privacy
Act of 1974, was a compromise measure attained through informal
discussions between House and Senate representatives. As presented
to each chamber for action, the proposed legislation contained a new
subsection (2) in section (b), providing as follows:
"(b) Conditions of disclosure. - No agency shall disclose any record
which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a writ61.
62.

H.R. REP. No. 1416, at 18.
Id. at 19.

63. The Committee language on this subject, however, appears somewhat in
conflict. While it observes that "H.R. 16,373 would make all individually-identifiable
information in Government files exempt from public disclosure," it also indicated
that it "does not desire that agencies cease making individually-identifiable records
open to the public, including the press, for inspection and copying." H.R. REP. No.
1416, at 13. The Committee explained its intention to allow "by published rule only
those disclosures which would not violate the spirit of the Freedom of Information
Act by constituting 'clearly unwarranted' invasions of privacy." Id.
64. Congressman Ichord offered an amendment to expand the Privacy Act's exemption for investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes by removing
reference in the House bill (H.R. 16,373, §(k)(2)) to allowing material to remain open
if accessible under the FOIA's exemption seven. 120 CONG. REC. 36, 650 (1974). The
stated purpose of this amendment was to protect investigatory material from access
by persons without "legitimate or excusable purpose." Id. at 36,651. Congressman
Erlenborn offered an amendment adopted by the House adding additional exemptions to subsection (k). While the Congressman intended to conform protections in
the Privacy Act for confidential sources and other investigatory material to those included in the FOIA Amendments, he nonetheless observed that the new privacy legislation would still provide "far greater access than individuals have at the present
time." Id. at 36,655-58. Finally, Congresswoman Abzug proposed to eliminate the CIA
exemption in the Privacy legislation; the Abzug amendment, however, was defeated.
Id. at 36,960-62.
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ten request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to
whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be

(2) required under Section 552 of this title [FOIA]

...

,

The explanation for this language was contained in a staff memorandum, inserted in the Congressional Record in both the. House and
Senate by the managers of the legislation. That memorandum explained the new language as follows:
The compromise amendment would add an additional condition of
disclosure to the House bill which prohibits disclosure without written
request of an individual unless disclosure of the record would be pursuant to section 552 of the Freedom of Information Act. This compromise is designed to preserve the status quo as interpreted by the
courts regarding the disclosure of personal information under that
section. 6
In explaining this new subsection, the staff memorandum referred to the absence of any specific provision in the House bill for
the FOIA access to information that the Privacy Act protected, and
also to the Senate bill and its section 205(b), which specifically recognized the need to permit the FOIA disclosures. In this context,
section b(2) appears to be an addition to the earlier House measure
and a substitute for the earlier, albeit more precise, Senate language.
The compromise bill also retained subsection (q) from the Senate
proposal, prohibiting any agency from relying on a FOIA exemption
to withhold from an individual any record otherwise accessible
under the Privacy Act."
There were two other references, although indirect, to the FOIA
in the new privacy bill. The new legislation provided that the requirements imposed on agencies relating to determining the accuracy of information s and maintaining an accounting of disclosure' 9
would not apply to disclosures made under the FOIA.
President Ford signed the Privacy Act of 1974 into law on the
first of January, 1975. He applauded the balance struck in the legislation between the right of the individual and the interests of society, but indicated disappointment "that the provisions of disclosure
of personal information by agencies make no substantive change in
the current law." This, in the President's opinion, did not "adequately protect the individual against unnecessary disclosures of
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1982).
66. 120 CONG. REc. 40,882 (1974).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1982). This section reads as follows: "No agency shall
rely on any exemption contained in Section 552 of this title to withhold from an
individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions of this section." Id.
68. Id. § 552a(e)(6).
69. Id. § 552a(c)(1).
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B. Analysis of Privacy Act Legislative History
It is quite clear from the above recitation of legislative history
that the House and Senate approached the relationship between the
FOIA and Privacy Act very differently. The legislative history of
section 3418, from its introduction through its approval by the full
Senate, reflects a strong commitment of the Senate that the Privacy
Act not become the exclusive avenue for individual access to records
in a system that the Act covers. The House committee report on
H.R. 16,373 and early versions of that legislation suggest that the
House of Representatives either simply did not consider the relationship between the two laws or intended the Privacy Act provisions and exemptions to close alternative forms of subject access to
covered records. Various comments during floor debate in the
House, however, hint that members did recognize that FOIA would
remain a basis for access to records, even those the new Privacy Law
71
covered.
Congress could have written clearer language to reflect its intentions to have the Privacy Act become a separate, but not preclusive,
means of access to government records in the compromise bill. Congress specifically stated, in section (q) of the Privacy Act, that it did
not intend the FOIA exemptions to affect disclosure under the Privacy Act. The Senate itself certainly knew how to draft language to
accomplish this end, as it had done in sections 202(c) and 205(b) of
section 3418.7' But, while Congress could have been clear in expressing its intent that the Privacy Act not affect the mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA, it failed to do so.
Nonetheless, Congress did adopt legislation that included the
new section (b)(2), and indicated in the only directly applicable legislative history accompanying its ultimate compromise bill that this
section was intended to replace the deleted section 205(b) in the
Senate bill.78 Despite the fact that Congress otherwise adopted basically the House bill, the inclusion of this new section (b)(2) appears
clearly to reject the earlier position of the House that individually
identifiable information should be "exempt
from public
74
disclosure.
In addition, references in the new privacy law to the FOIA dis70. Statement of President Gerald Ford upon signing the Privacy Act of 1974
(January 1, 1975), reprinted in PRIVACY SouacE BOOK, supra note 53, at 1001.
71. E.g., 120 CONG. REc. 36,647, 36,655-56 (1974).
72. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
73. Staff Memorandum, 120 CONG. REC. 40,881 (1974).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 93-416, at 13.
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closure as an exception in those sections dealing with agency determination of accuracy and accounting procedures support the view
that Congress contemplated continued disclosure of covered records
under the FOIA.7 In the event that the FOIA disclosures covered
records the Privacy Act preempted, there would have been no need
to include these FOIA exceptions in the accuracy and accounting
sections. These accuracy and accounting exceptions must have been
inserted in contemplation of subject access to records under the
FOIA,7 since the sixth exemption of the FOIA would inhibit many
third-party disclosures.
There are further interpretations of both the statutory language
and legislative history that compel the conclusion that Congress did
not intend the Privacy Act to be an exemption three statute. First,
the exemption language of the Privacy Act provides that the head of
an agency may issue rules that "exempt any system of records
within the agency from any part of this section . . ." except for specifically applicable provisions." Congress could have used language
to allow the agency head to exempt such records from any part "of
this title," which would have included the FOIA as well as the Privacy Act. By not doing so, Congress appears to have intended that
the limitation be to "this section"-section 552a, the Privacy Act
itself-and not the FOIA as well.
Secondly, the Privacy Act is, in its entirety, a fair information
practices statute, involving not only subject access but requirements
on accounting, collection, notice, accuracy, and more.7 s The purpose
of the law, expressed time and again, is primarily to insure that
agency records are maintained so as not to infringe personal privacy.
The FOIA, on the other hand, is purely and simply a disclosure statute.7 9 Thus the Privacy Act exemptions have meaning and impact if
applied only to Privacy Act requirements, while they would effect an
implied repeal of certain FOIA provisions if they were applied to
that Act.
Thirdly, FOIA access to covered records is recognized in various
parts of the Privacy Act. Since the FOIA clearly allows disclosure to
''any person" and the subject of a record is certainly a "person"
under the FOIA, the Privacy Act must have contemplated continued
75. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
76. The FOIA-disclosure exemption to the accuracy requirement was separately
and specifically added by a "technical amendment" the day after Senate passage of
the compromise bill. Amendment number (1) to S. 3418, § 203(b), 120 CONG. REc.
40879; PRIVACY SOURCE BooK, supra note 53, at 878.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1982).
78. For a further discussion of the history and purpose of the Privacy Act see
supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
79. For a further discussion of the history and purpose of FOIA see supra notes
1-10 and accompanying text.
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FOIA access by the subject of records.
Furthermore, Congress had labored extensively over the language of exemption seven of the FOIA; the amendment to that exemption was even discussed and language from it used in the context of Privacy Act exemptions and amendments. The additional
access rights to investigatory records that the seventh exemption
provided would have been ephemeral if closed down by the Privacy
Act.
Lastly, there is no evidence from the legislative history of the
Privacy Act that Congress believed there was too much disclosure
under the FOIA. The FOIA's seventh exemption had been amended
specifically to increase disclosure of investigatory files, and subsection (q) was inserted into the Privacy Act to allow greater disclosure
under that law than would have been allowed under the FOIA. Thus
Congress did not identify any problem through which foreclosing
FOIA access by Privacy Act restrictions would have provided a
solution.
C. 1974 FOIA Amendments
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA
further indicates that Congress did not intend for the Privacy Act to
be the exclusive means of access for subject requesters. First, when
Congress enacted the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, it was also
putting the finishing touches on privacy legislation. Thus the legislative history does not indicate an awareness by Congress that its
FOIA amendments would not fully operate. The legislative history
does not refer to the Privacy Act, whose future was still in doubt
when both houses initially approved the FOIA legislation. This, at
least, suggests Congress did not expect that the FOIA would be limited by the Privacy Act.
In addition, the 1974 amendments to the FOIA were enacted to
broaden disclosure, not restrict it. On the floor of the Senate, during
consideration of the 1974 FOIA Amendments, Senator Philip Hart
proposed a major revision of the seventh exemption, which the Senate later adopted with some modification.80 The plain and stated in80. Exemption 7 originally applied to "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes." Senator Hart's amendment was a response to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of exemption seven. The Seventh Circuit had stated that an
agency needed only to demonstrate that the documents were an investigatory file
compiled for law enforcement purposes and need not show why the disclosure of the
document should not be made. Congress believed this was inconsistent with its intent
when it passed the FOIA in 1966. In addition, Congress feared that with such an
interpretation, otherwise nonexempt records would be hidden in law enforcement
files to avoid disclosure. Consequently, the Senate passed Senator Hart's amendment
that made the seventh exemption apply only to law enforcement information the dis-
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tention behind this narrowing of the scope of the "investigatory
files" exemption was to increase opportunity for public access to law

enforcement records.81 Likewise, on the Senate floor Senator Muskie

proposed - and the Senate adopted -a new and tighter version of
the FOIA's first exemption dealing with national defense and foreign

policy." Both the Hart and Muskie amendments were designed to
constrict severely the scope of the first and seventh exemptions and
allow greater access to the information to which these exemptions

had previously been applicable.
With a clearly disclosure-oriented post-Watergate frame of
mind Congress did not, in the fall of 1974, appear interested in constricting public access to information, as the 1974 amendments to
the FOIA indicate. This posture by Congress, coupled with the lack
of reference to the Privacy Act during the debate over the 1974
Amendments to the FOIA, emphasizes that Congress did not intend
for the Privacy Act to be an exclusive mechanism for a subject requester to limit the FOIA in any way.

IV.

CONGRESSIONAL, AGENCY, AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AFTER
THE ENACTMENT OF THE PRIVACY ACT

Although not explicitly stated, the legislative history of the Privacy Act and the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA support a finding
that Congress did not intend for the Privacy Act to be an exemption
three statute under the FOIA. Congressional statements, after the
Privacy Act was enacted, consistently reflected this view. Nevertheclosure of which would cause one of a number of enumerated harms. See Senate debate of May 30, 1974, reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS
SOURCE BOOK, COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 281, 332-33 (Joint

Comm. Print 1975); see also CONFERENCE REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 , reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6285, 6287. This exemption was
again amended in 1986, that time to clarify and to arguably broaden information
covered by exemption seven. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(7) (1982); see also Allen v. Department of Defense, 658 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1986). But see Wilkinson v. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Civ. No. 80-1048 (C.D. Ca. July 17, 1987).
81. The Senate later adopted an amendment to its privacy bill that replaced the
earlier investigatory files exemption with the same language previously adopted by
the Senate for the FOIA's seventh exemption. This language was ultimately deleted
in the final compromise. See amendment to section 203(b) of S. 3418, 120 CONG. REC.
36,920 (1974), reprinted in PRIVACY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 53, at 765-66.
82. Exemption one originally applied to records "specifically required by executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." After
the Supreme Court concluded that under this language courts could not look behind
or second guess executive branch decisions to classify documents, Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973), Congress amended the statute to
authorize the judiciary to examine classification decisions de novo. See H.R. REP. No.
876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS 6267,
6272; see also CONFERENCE REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6285, 6287.
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less, the courts and agencies continued to struggle with the apparent
conflict between the Privacy Act and the FOIA with regard to subject requesters. The disparate interpretations of the conflict among
the courts, the agencies, and Congress ultimately led the Congress to
resolve the conflict through legislation.
A.

Post-Enactment Congressional Statements

From the date of enactment of the Privacy Act, there had been
occasional disputes and discussions regarding whether that law was
intended to preclude subject (or "first-party") access to material in
systems of records covered by that Act. Both members of Congress
and staff of relevant congressional committees went on record on
this subject. They unanimously adhered to the view that the Privacy
Act was not intended to provide an exclusive means of access to individually identifiable records and that the Privacy Act was not to
be considered an exemption three statute under the FOIA.
The first expression of this view was contained in an article by
the Counsel to the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations, who was responsible for much of the
drafting and negotiation on behalf of Senator Ervin during congressional consideration of the Privacy Act.83 In that article, after noting
that many of the same members of Congress and staff played important roles in the adoption of both the FOIA amendments of 1974
and the Privacy Act, the author commented: "If information about
an individual would be released under an FOI [Freedom of Information] Act request, it could be released under b(2) of the Privacy
Act." 4
Shortly before the Privacy Act was to become effective, Senator
Edward Kennedy wrote the Attorney General a strong and detailed
letter stating that "[iut would be manifestly unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended in the Privacy Act to carve out large
implied exemptions to the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act." Senator Kennedy, who had authored and managed the
1974 FOIA amendments in the Senate, recited various arguments
based on analysis and legislative history and concluded as follows:
"It appears clearly intended that access under the Privacy Act is to
be complete, and not subject to the FOIA exemptions, where the
Privacy Act grants access. But where the Privacy Act does not grant
access, the FOIA - and its exemptions-apply.""B
83. Davidson, The Privacy Act of 1974-Exceptions and Exemptions, 34 FED.
B.J. 279 (1975), reprinted in PRIVACY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 53, at 1191.

84. Id.
85. This correspondence is reprinted in PRIVACY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 53, at
1178-80. Also included with Senator Kennedy's correspondence was a study by the

1988]

The Privacy Act and the FOIA

The following year Congresswoman Abzug, Chairwoman of the
House Subcommittee that had been responsible for enactment of
both the Privacy Act and the FOIA, placed in the Congressional
Record a study analyzing the annual reports under the FOIA submitted to the Congress by executive agencies for 1975. She noted
that seven executive branch entities "cited the Privacy Act 146
times when invoking the FOIA Act exemption pertaining to statutory prohibitions." Abzug condemned this practice, commenting
that "the Privacy Act specifically states that it was not intended to
restrict access to records available under the Freedom of Information Act .
,s"8'
Finally, the staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure (the Subcommittee responsible for FOIA
legislation and oversight) submitted a report to the Congress on
oversight hearings relating to implementation of the 1974 FOIA
amendments. In that report, the staff observed that the Privacy Act
"was never intended to restrict access to reports under FOIA."8
These congressional reports and comments consistently reflected a view that condemned an Executive branch inclination to
use the Privacy Act to foreclose access to records under the FOIA.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission, established by the Privacy Act to report on the functioning of that law, stated in its final
report its complete agreement with this conclusion. 8 Legal commentators have also consistently adhered to this view.89 Yet, the agencies
and the courts interpreted the conflict quite differently, resulting in
conflicting views on this issue.
B. Administrative Interpretation and Practice
Under the FOIA, the Department of Justice is given the role of
lead agency for the purposes of reporting information and providing
policy guidance to federal agencies."' The Office of Management and
Congressional Research Service supporting these conclusions. 121
94 (1975).
86. 122 CONG. REC. 26,447-48 (1976).

CONG.

REC. 32,888-

87. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON

1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
123 n.76 (1980) [hereinafter REPORT ON OVERSIGHT HEARINGS].
88. Report of the Privacy Protection Study Comm'n, Privacy Act of 1974: An
Assessment app. 4, at 37 (1977).
89. See Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 87 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (citing sources). The American Bar Association, in a resolution adopted by
its House of Delegates, also supported this conclusion. A single contrary view appeared in a student comment. Comment, Greentree v. United States Custom Service:
A Misrepresentationof the Relationship Between FOIA Exemption 3 and the Privacy Act, 63 B.U.L. REV. 507 (1983).
90. See Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN.
AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF
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Budget ("OMB"), on the other hand, is charged with developing
"guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in implementing"
the Privacy Act and with providing "continuing 'assistance to and
oversight of the implementation" of that law.9' The two agencies'
interpretations of the conflict between the Privacy Act and the
FOIA are important to understanding how other agencies processed
individual requests after the enactment of the Privacy Act.
1. Department of Justice
Shortly after enactment of the 1974 FOIA amendments and the
Privacy Act, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mary Lawton advised the Internal Revenue Service that the Privacy Act should be
considered the exclusive avenue available to an individual seeking
information about himself.9 2 Following an exchange of correspondence between other Justice Department officials and Senator Edward Kennedy, 93 the Department altered its view and published its
own regulations affording to an individual seeking records about
himself access that is coextensive with the maximum disclosure provided under both the Privacy Act and the FOIA.9 ' The Department,
however, noted that it was taking this approach as a matter of discretion, without waiving the position that Privacy Act exemptions
were still available."
In early litigation on this issue, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") adhered to a position consistent with its then-applicable
regulation. In fact, the government argued strongly before the district court in Greentree v. United States Customs Service"' for the
proposition that the Privacy Act was not an exemption three statute, citing "the government's uniform and long-standing practice"
on that issue.97
L. REV. 1, 47-53, 61-64 (1988) (discussing the role of the Justice Department in coordinating administration of the FOIA).
91. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 6, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909 (1974)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
92. PRIVACY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 53, at 1177-78.
93. Id. at 1178-80.
94. 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.11, 16.40-.58 (1984).

95. 28 C.F.R. § 16.70-.103 (1976).
96. 515 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
97. Greentree, 674 F.2d at 85 n.27 (citing Brief for the Government, joint appendix 29, at 35). Frank Greentree had been convicted for attempting to smuggle

several tons of marijuana into the country. Id. at 75. After his conviction in federal
court in Louisiana, he brought suit in federal district court to enjoin pending state

prosecution based on the same events. Id. In furtherance of this civil action, Green-

tree filed FOIA and Privacy Act requests with the Customs Service and the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") to uncover information about the federal investigation
preceding his prosecution. See id. Customs and the DEA located responsive records
but withheld the information on various FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions. See id.

When the agencies denied his request, Greentree sued in the United States District
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On appeal, however, the Department argued that the Privacy
Act was an exemption three statute. In reversing its course in the
Greentree appeal, the Department acknowledged that it was "taking
a position different from the one argued in the District Court" and
indicated that its decision in this regard was supported by its examination of court precedents. Furthermore, it "was made at the highest levels of the Justice Department only after considerable discussion and analysis." s
The DOJ did not seek Supreme Court review in the Greentree
case. Nor did DOJ representatives, in testimony before congressional committees during both the 98th and 97th Congresses, propose that Congress amend either the FOIA or the Privacy Act to
clarify this issue. Nevertheless, the DOJ continued to argue that the
Privacy Act was an exemption three statute in cases pending before
circuit courts of appeals."
In 1983, the DOJ proposed a revision of its regulations implementing the FOIA and Privacy Acts,' 00 which purported to address
solely the procedural aspects relating to the handling of requests
under these two laws. Although the proposed regulations made no
affirmative reference to this point, the effect of their adoption would
have been the deletion of the section in existing regulations providing that whenever an individual requests information pertaining to
himself, he is entitled to receive access to all those records to which
he would be entitled under both the Privacy Act and the FOIA.' 0 '
Under the new proposal, the Privacy Act would become the exclusive avenue of access by an individual to records concerning himself.
The subtlety-and perhaps schizophrenia-of the Justice Department's position was more clearly reflected in advice given
through the Department's publication, FOIA Update. There the Office of Information and Privacy warned agencies that, in light of the
Greentree ruling,10 2 they should not withhold subject information
that is exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act but releasable
under the FOIA. The DOJ advised agencies that while it would defend the withholding of information were a suit on this subject
Court for the District of Columbia. Id. On its own initiative, the district court requested briefs on whether records exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act are
covered automatically under the FOIA's exemption three. Id. Both Greentree and the
government agreed that the Privacy Act was not an exemption three statute. Id. The
district court, however, disagreed. Greentree, 515 F. Supp. at 1147-49.
98. Brief for the Appellees at 14, Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674
F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Nos. 81-1829, 81-1830).
99. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 35,892 (1983) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 0 and 6) (proposed Aug. 8, 1983).
101. The new regulations would have deleted 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.11, 16.40-.58
(1984).
102. Greentree, 674 F.2d at 74; see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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brought in any circuit other than the District of Columbia, agencies
should not apply the Privacy Act as an exemption three statute at
the administrative level because by doing so they would "run the
unacceptable risk that the requester would file suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which would inescapably
result in a judicial finding of improper withholding .
*...,,
2.

Office of Management and Budget

Initially, OMB circulated the Lawton-IRS letter1 0 ' to all agencies, thereby associating itself with the position that the Privacy Act
was an exemption three statute. After the Justice Department modified its view on that subject, OMB adopted a policy that would assure that "individuals do not, as a consequence of the Privacy Act,
have less access to information pertaining to themselves than they
had prior to its enactment." ' 5 During consideration of the Greentree appeal, however, the court was notified that OMB was considering a revision of this policy. A proposed revision was published on
August 10, 1983, flatly stating that the Privacy Act and the FOIA
should be read to allow an agency to deny access to records sought
by a subject individual under the FOIA on the basis that those
records were exempted from release under the Privacy Act. 06 This
interpretation proposed to read the Privacy Act as a statute specifically prohibiting disclosure under the FOIA pursuant to exemption
three of the FOIA.
3.

Agency Practice

Given the interpretation of the FOIA and Privacy Act relationship by the Department of Justice and OMB, it is no surprise that
annual FOIA reports of federal agencies written during the early
years of the Privacy Act's operation disclosed that agencies often
cited the Privacy Act when invoking the third exemption to the
FOIA. 107 For awhile this phenomenon receded; it was revived in
1979 when the Drug Enforcement Agency, the FBI, and other entities in the Justice Department, along with the Customs Service, began relying anew on the Privacy Act as an exemption three statute.
This reliance led to litigation challenging those agencies' position
and, ultimately, to congressional action.
103.
104.

DEPARTMENT O1 JUSTicE, 4 FOIA UPDATE No. 2, at 3 (Spring 1983).
See PRIVACY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 53, and text accompanying note 92.

105. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,743 (1975).
106. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,359 (1983).
107.

See REPORT ON

OVERSIGHT HEARINGS,

supra note 87, at 25.
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C.

Judicial Consideration of FOIA-Privacy Relationship

Before Congress acted to resolve the conflict, courts of appeals
had split on the question whether the Privacy Act could be used to
exclude first-party access to individually identifiable materials under
FOIA. The District of Columbia 0 8 and Third0 9 Circuits ruled in the
negative; the Fifth " and Seventh 1 ' Circuits concluded in the
affirmative. "'
The arguments presented to these courts by both requesters
and the government on whether the Privacy Act should preclude
FOIA access have been discussed in preceding sections. One single
generalization can be made about these cases: courts upholding reliance on the Privacy Act as an exclusive avenue for access to materials and systems covered by that act offered little or no analysis of
the detailed relationship between the Privacy Act and the FOIA, the
legislative history of the Privacy Act, and the implications of their
holdings. It was not at all surprising that the Supreme Court accepted certiorari on two conflicting cases'18 before Congress enacted
legislation reaffirming the primacy of the FOIA as governing access
to all government records.
V.

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION OF FOIA-PRIVAcY ACT CONFLICT

The diverse interpretations of the relationship between the Privacy Act and the FOIA by Congress, the agencies, and the courts
motivated Congress to resolve the issue through legislation. In 1984,
108. Greentree, 674 F.2d at 74; see also National Ass'n of Atomic Veterans, Inc.
v. Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, 583 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (D.D.C. 1984).
109. Porter v. United States Dep't of Justice, 717 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1983);
Provenzano v. United States Dep't of Justice; 717 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (per
curiam), cert. granted, 466 U.,S. 926 (1984), vacated as moot, 469 U.S. 14 (1984).
110. Painter v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980).
111. Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 466 U.S. 926 (1984), vacated as moot, 469 U.S. 14 (1984), remanded, 762
F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1985); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Stimac v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 586 F. Supp. 34
(N.D. Il. 1984); Stimac v. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, 577 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. IlL. 1984); Martin v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nos. 83-C-123, 80-C-1620, 83-C-1846 (N.D.IlI. filed Sept. 30, 1983); Turner v.
Ralston, 567 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
112. The Fourth Circuit held that where a disclosure to a third party was authorized under the FOIA, it would not violate the Privacy Act. Jafari v. Department
of the Navy, 728 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1984). Law enforcement records were not at issue
in this case, and it is not clear what result would have been reached had the court
concluded that the Privacy Act would have barred disclosure of the records to the
individual to whom they pertained.
113. Provenzano, 717 F.2d 799; Shapiro, 721 F.2d 215. For a fascinating analysis of the Justice Department's maneuvers in an effort to focus Supreme Court review
on the case with the most sympathetic facts, see SULLIVAN, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 452
(1987).
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Congress amended the Privacy Act to comport firmly with the original language of that Act, FOIA, and their legislative histories. The
amendment stated that the Privacy Act is not an exemption three
statute under the the FOIA. This resolution by Congress was most
consistent with the objectives and purposes of both statutes.
The Privacy Act amendment was hardly the subject of a
groundswell of public and congressional interest. In January 1984,
Congressman Glenn English introduced a short bill to clarify that
the Privacy Act in no way inhibits access, by either third parties or
the subject of the records sought, to information not exempt from
disclosure under the FOIA."'
Aware that the matter was still in litigation, the sponsors of this
bill made clear that its language was not intended to effect any
change in the Privacy Act, but simply to restate the proper relationship between the FOIA and the Privacy Act intended by Congress
from the start.'15
Early in the 98th Congress, the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees had been working to address the administrative
problems the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") had in implementing the FOIA. This gave rise to consideration of legislation to
modify application of the FOIA to the CIA. In the House, Congressman English obtained agreement that his subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations would have an opportunity to review legislation that the House Intelligence Committee reported on
this subject. Congressman English also held his own hearings on the
CIA Information Act.'"6 During those hearings witnesses addressed
the Justice Department's efforts to establish, through litigation, that
Privacy Act exemptions could serve to block access to records under
the FOIA.

117

When the CIA Information Act was reported from the House
Committee on Government Operations, it contained as an amendment section two, which inserted a subsection in the Privacy Act
stating: "No agency shall rely on any exemption in this section to
withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible
to such individual under the provisions of section 552 of this title
114. H.R. No. 4696, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
115. 130 CONG. REC. H310-312 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1984).
116. Central Intelligence Agency Information Act: Hearings on H.R. 5164
Before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice & Agriculture, of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
117. Id. at 58, 62. In another set of hearings on FOIA reform generally, the
author urged Congressman English and his subcommittee to clarify through statute
that the Privacy Act was not a bar to disclosure under the FOIA. Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings on S. 774 Before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice & Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 962 (1984).
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[FOIA]." The House Government Operations Committee report explained this amendment in the following terms:
With the enactment of the Privacy Act Amendment and H.R. 5164,
individuals will continue to be able to make requests for records about
themselves using the procedures in either the Privacy Act, FOIA, or
both. Agencies will be obliged to continue to process requests under
either or both laws. Agencies that had made it a practice to treat a
request made under either law as if the request were made under both
laws should continue to do so. Information that is exempt under FOIA
but not under the Privacy Act will have to be disclosed when requested under the Privacy Act. Information that is exempt under the
Privacy Act but not under FOIA will have to be disclosed when requested under the FOIA." 8
This amendment remained in the House bill, which was not conferenced but was sent to the Senate for its final approval.
A conflict arose between the CIA and the DOJ over the proposed House amendment. The CIA, with enactment of the new bill,
would obtain substantial relief from the administrative burdens of
the FOIA. Therefore, it explicitly agreed, as part of a compromise
allowing this relief, that it would continue to allow individuals access to their own files under Privacy Act standards. The DOJ's objective was just the opposite. It wanted the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to be able to invoke Privacy Act exemptions to
block subject access to files in those agencies. The Department was
most unhappy with this proposed House amendment and lobbied
behind the scenes to attempt to have it removed in both the House
and the Senate.11 In the end, the views of the CIA prevailed and
the Administration supported Senate acceptance of the legislation,
as passed by the House.1"' The Senate proceeded to approve the legislation without dissent. 21 The result was an amendment to the Privacy Act, that explicitly resolved the conflict between that act and
FOIA. Thus, no longer could either Act be claimed to diminish access under the other.
VI.

JUDICIAL AND AGENCY CONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION

The congressional amendment to the Privacy Act in 1984 resolved the conflict between that Act and the FOIA. Congress explicitly stated that neither Act was to be treated as the exclusive means
of disclosure for a subject requester. Subsequent interpretations by
the courts indicate that this resolution was sound and free from am118.
119.
120.
121.
by a vote

H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., at 16-17 (1984).
10 ACCESS Repts. No. 19, at 1-2 (Sept. 26, 1984).
See 130 CONG. REc. S12,396 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984).
Id. at S12397. The House vote, on September 19, 1984, approved the bill
of 369 to 36. 130 CONG. REc. H9817 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
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biguities. Agency implementation after the amendment also rein-

forces that the resolution of the conflict between the two Acts was
workable and consistent with the objectives and purposes of both
statutes.
A.

Judicial Consideration

As indicated earlier, the federal courts were divided on the issue
of whether the Privacy Act was an exemption three statute under

the FOIA. The Supreme Court accepted certiorarion two conflicting
cases.122 While these cases were pending, Congress enacted legislation stating neither the Privacy Act nor the FOIA is to be treated as
exclusive to the other. 123 Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the two cases for action consistent with the
amendment.""
On remand, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered whether the subject requester was entitled to documents under the FOIA, even
though they were exempt from disclosure under the j(2) exemption
of the Privacy Act. 25 The court held that:
Congress intend[ed] that the courts to construe the Privacy Act and
the FOIA separately and independently so that exemption from disclosure under the Privacy Act does not exempt disclosure under the
FOIA, and visa versa.. . . [I]nformation may be unavailable when a
party requests access to that information under the Privacy Act but
may be available when that information is requested under [FOIA].120
Later court decisions concur with the Seventh Circuit's clear
construction of the amendment to the Privacy Act.2 7 The D.C. Circuit has recently set forth the procedure agencies should follow in
determining whether documents should be withheld in light of the
Privacy Act amendment. 28 The court stated:
In order to withhold these documents . . . the agency must demonstrate that the documents fall within some exception under each act.
If a FOIA exemption covers the documents, but the Privacy exemption does not, the documents must be released under the Privacy Act;
122. See supra note 113.
123. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
124. Department of Justice v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14 (1984).
125. Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 762 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 612.
127. See May v. Department of Air Force, 777 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1985); Ely v.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 781 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Department
of Justice, Civ. No. 86-6162 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 2, 1987).
128. Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 819 F.2d
1181 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Miller v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y.
1986). In Miller, the agency claimed that documents were exempt under both the
Privacy Act and the FOIA. The district court found that the records were properly
withheld by the agency under the FOIA. It did not, however, proceed to determine
whether the documents were properly withheld under the Privacy Act. Id.
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if a Privacy Act exemption but not a FOIA exemption applies, the
documents must be released under FOIA.1
It seems quite plain that all courts that subsequently examined
the FOIA-Privacy Act relationship with regard to subject access
agree on the meaning of the Privacy Act amendment. Their consistent treatment of the amendment indicates that Congress' resolution was clear and left no ambiguities regarding the relationship between the two Acts; each is to be treated independently from the
other.
B.

Agency Treatment of the Resolution

The DOJ, in keeping with the spirit as well as the letter of the
1984 congressional action, has advised federal agencies not only to
provide maximum access afforded by both the FOIA and Privacy
Acts, but to process requests by individuals for information concerning themselves under both laws. The DOJ has concluded: "[W]ere
an agency to process an access request which cites only the Privacy
Act (or, for that matter, no statute at all) under the Privacy Act
alone, it would likely have to reprocess that request under FOIA
once the requester (or, ultimately, a court) realized the narrowness
of the agency's action."18 The Department states that it is therefore
good policy for agencies to treat all subject access requests as FOIA
requests (as well as possibly Privacy Act requests), regardless of
whether the FOIA is cited in a requester's letter."'
Some agencies, however, have not amended their regulations to
conform explicitly with the new amendment. For example, the Treasury Department's regulations state "exemptions from disclosure
under [FOIA] may not be invoked for the purpose of withholding
from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such
individual under the Privacy Act. ' 132 Yet, there is not similar provision indicating that the Privacy Act exemptions cannot be invoked
to deprive a person of records if the records are accessible under the
FOIA.138 There are no other agency regulations that even refer to
the new amendment. In the interest of clarity and notice to the public, agencies should be urged to amend their regulations to comport
with the new amendment to the Privacy Act.
129. Martin, 819 F.2d at 1184.

130.
131.
132.
133.
31 C.F.R.

7 FOIA UPDATE No. 1, at 6 (Winter 1986).
Id.
31 C.F.R. § 1.26(g)(5) (1987).
The regulation does, however, refer the reader to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q) (1982).
§ 1.26(g)(5) (1987).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
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THE NEED FOR FURTHER LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION

The amendment to the Privacy Act in 1984 resolved the conflict
between that Act and the FOIA with regard to subject requesters.
The amendment made it clear that neither the Privacy Act nor the
FOIA could preclude disclosure to a subject requester under the
other. Subsequent judicial and agency consideration of the amendment indicates that it has clarified any ambiguity and confusion
that existed on this issue. There are, however, other aspects of the
FOIA-Privacy Act relationship that remain ambiguous and unclear.
A. Mailing Lists
Disclosure of mailing lists has proved to be a perplexing problem under the FOIA. The problem has become more complicated by
the Privacy Act. Under the FOIA, exemption six has traditionally
governed disclosure of mailing lists. Pursuant to this exemption, an
agency must disclose a mailing list unless it finds that the disclosure
will constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 1 ' In making this determination, the agency must balance the
public interest in disclosure against the individual's interest in
privacy.1"
A number of agencies, however, have concluded that, while the
privacy intrusion involved in the disclosure of mailing lists may not
be sufficient to warrant protection under exemption six, the cost of
providing lists regularly impose an administrative burden out of line
with the costs that may be recovered under the FOIA. This is especially the case where names and addresses are maintained in a computerized database and the agency does not ordinarily print hard
copy or store the data precisely in the format requested by the person asking for the list. This has led the DOJ to recommend, and
some agencies to adopt, a policy of denial of all requests for mailing
lists under exemption two of the FOIA protecting matters relating
to internal personnel rules and practices."3 6
The burden justification for the invocation of exemption two
over mailing lists can be challenged. If agencies were permitted to
134.
135.
136.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). See supra note 27.
The Justice Department's position is set forth in 7 FOIA UPDATE No. 3, at

3 (Summer, 1986). The Department of Defense ("DOD") has recently issued a memorandum promulgating its policy on the issue. Memorandum on DOD Policy on the
Release of Lists Containing the Names and Duty Addresses of DOD Personnel, Ref.
No. 88-Corr-16 (January 13, 1988). In its memorandum the Department states that
"it shall be DOD policy that DOD components shall not release lists containing the
names and duty addresses of DOD personnel .... All requests for such lists are to
be processed pursuant to the [FOIA] . . . under Exemption 2." Id.
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charge the requester for the mailing list the administrative-burden
argument would disappear. Under such circumstances, the lists
would be disclosed so long as there was no invasion of personal privacy. Since commercial entities make most of the requests for mailing lists, the charge by the agencies could be based on an assessment
of the value of the list. Consequently, the sale of mailing lists could
actually generate revenue for the agency.
The ability for agencies to charge for mailing lists is unclear because the Privacy Act prohibits the sale or rental of mailing lists
unless the law specifically authorizes it."' 7 Although the Privacy Act
adds that this prohibition "shall not be construed to require the
withholding of names and addresses otherwise permitted to be made
public," as a practical matter, this has been the result of the
provision.
It is unclear how this problem will be resolved. Reliance on exemption two of the FOIA to withhold mailing lists is currently being
challenged in the courts."8 Congress needs to clarify its intention
regarding the disclosure and the sale of mailing lists. In resolving
this issue Congress should consider the following issues. There is no
compelling reason to believe that privacy interests are served by a
prohibition on the sale of mailing lists where, but for the administrative burden, agencies would readily release those lists under the
FOIA. In addition, where some special programming is necessary to
render the lists disclosable, or to put them in a format useful to the
requester, the FOIA may not even compel disclosure without regard
to the exemptions, since no existing "record" has been requested."'
Since this is claimed to be one of the greatest burdens on the
agency, the justification under exemptions two is clearly underlined.
Both the public and the government would benefit by allowing agencies to sell lists under these circumstances. Congress should explicitly state that the government may exact appropriate charges for
these mailing lists.
B.

Fees and Deadlines

Another unsettled aspect of the FOIA-Privacy Act relationship
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(n) (1982).
138. Compare Army Times Publishing Co. v. Department of the Army, 684 F.
Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1988) (exemption two inapplicable), with Schwaner v. Department
of the Air Force, Civ. No. 88-0560 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1988) (exemption two applicable).

139. The FOIA only applies to agency records. The FOIA, however, does not
compel government agencies to create records. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132, 161 (1975). This concept has been extended to computer programs. An

agency is under no obligation to develop a computer program to extract disclosable
information from a database. Clarke v. Department of Treasury, Civ. No. 84-1873
(E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 24, 1986).
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is whether agencies may charge fees to a requester who invokes both
laws in making a request, and whether any time limits control the
required response. The FOIA allows agencies to charge for search
and copying' " and imposes deadlines on the agency response;, 1 the
Privacy Act does neither. Agency regulations, with scant exceptions,
address handling of requests under these statutes as separate and
distinct matters. But when both laws are invoked there is no indication of which law should control with regard to fees and deadlines.
Perhaps a reasonable approach to this problem would be to give
requesters the choice of invoking the Privacy Act procedures and
avoiding costs at the expense of time constraints on the agency, or
invoking the FOIA procedures and obtaining the agency deadlines at
the cost of search and copying fees. As long as agencies maintained
separate queues and staffed both equally, so that the "free" track
would involve only a longer queue and not a place in the queue behind paying customers, government and requester interests might
readily be balanced. This would not require legislative resolution.
Agencies could under existing law institute such procedures on their
own.
C.

Privacy Reforms

There are other, far more important weaknesses in the Privacy
Act and its implementation aside from its relationship to the FOIA.
These have been documented in hearings and a report by the House
Subcommittee on Government Information.14 2 Congress has spent a
great deal of time over the past decade examining problems with the
FOIA, " s and ultimately in 1986 amended that statute. 4 4 The Privacy Act could use the same attention.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since enactment of the FOIA, Congress has continued to expand public access to government information. Through amend140. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1982).
141. Id. § 552(a)(6).
142. H.R. REP. No. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
143. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S.
1730, and S.1751 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981); Freedom of Information Reform Act:
Hearings on S. 774 Before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice and
Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1984).

144. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 §§ 1801-1804, 100 Stat.
3207, 3248-49 (1986).
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ments in 1974,46 in 1976,146 and 1986,47 Congress responded to adverse judicial decisions and administrative interpretations to clarify
and emphasize that conflicts or ambiguities should be resolved in
favor of maximum disclosure of information. Congress' 1984 amendment to the Privacy Act resolving that FOIA disclosure mandates
are to take primacy over Privacy Act exemptions is in keeping with
this pattern. It provides a message that, in future conflicts over disclosure, should not be lost on the courts or government agencies.

145. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
146. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409 § 5, 90 Stat. 1241,
1247 (1976).
147. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 9-570 §§ 1801-1804, 100 Stat.
3207, 3248-49 (1986).

